By creating a knowledge base that reduces innovation costs, imitation can serve as a stepping stone enabling¯rms from lagging countries to undertake innovation. This paper constructs a product cycle model with this feature to determine how a lagging country might shift its R&D toward innovation. The main¯nding is that increasing resources or subsidizing R&D increases innovation in the lagging country without decreasing innovation elsewhere, and hence can achieve an increase in the aggregate rate of innovation in the world. These e®ects are contrasted with the case where innovation does not occur in the lagging country.
Introduction
Japan has transformed from lagging behind the technology frontier to pushing the frontier forward. Japanese¯rms learned the technologies of more advanced countries through imitation, which then enabled these¯rms to improve the existing technologies. Thus, they shifted from imitation to increasingly creating better technologies themselves.
Japan's phenomenal success has made it a role model for many lagging countries. Behind Japan, the East Asian tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) { and behind them Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand { have begun to follow Japan's path by imitating technologies from abroad (see Carolan et al. 1998) . As imitation successes close the technology gap,¯rms from these countries are beginning to innovate.
How can a lagging country encourage its¯rms to do more innovation? What forces shift the distribution of a country's R&D activity toward innovation? Could resource accumulation or government R&D incentives accomplish this goal?
If there are ways for lagging countries to become more innovative, one might question whether their undertaking innovation is optimal from a national or global perspective. After all, the lagging South has comparative advantage in imitation relative to innovation compared to the advanced North. Does increased innovation in the South reduce innovation in the North? If so, then the total amount of innovation in the world might fall when the South tries to innovate more, and the reduced innovation could have adverse e®ects on welfare.
This paper examines the validity of such fears by determining the e®ect of parameter changes on Southern innovation, Northern innovation, aggregate innovation, and welfare in each country. This paper builds a product cycle model in which imitation can provide the vital knowledge base needed to make innovation attractive for a country that (on average) lags behind the world technology frontier. For lagging economies, innovation may be prohibitively di±cult unless imitation has brought practical knowledge of the current state-of-the-art into the country.
The model has two countries, the North (an advanced country) and the South (a lagging country). Northern¯rms innovate and Southern¯rms imitate. Southern¯rms may also innovate once a technology has been imitated by a Southern¯rm. Northern¯rms never imitate in this model because they lack the production cost advantage that makes imitation attractive in the South. A¯xed supply of one factor, labor, is used for R&D and production in each country.
Japan and the East Asian tigers are viewed as having succeeded through resource accumulation (see Young 1995) . Indeed, the results indicate that increasing the supply of Southern resources can provide the added resources needed to increase Southern innovation. An increase in Southern resources increases both imitation and Southern innovation. Because successful imitation makes innovation easier, Southern innovation increases relative to imitation, so Southern resource accumulation boosts Southern innovation both absolutely and relative to all Southern R&D. The boost in Southern innovation does not reduce Northern innovation { Northern innovators earn pro¯ts for a shorter period of time (due to faster imitation) but the pro¯ts are larger while they last (due to an increase in aggregate expenditure). Thus, increased Southern innovation generates increased aggregate innovation.
Government incentives to R&D could also encourage Southern¯rms to increase innovation. Such incentives need not be able to distinguish innovation from imitation in awarding subsidies. A Southern R&D subsidy to both innovation and imitation increases Southern innovation at the expense of imitation. Northern innovators su®er smaller pro¯ts but these pro¯ts last longer due to less imitation, so the reward to Northern innovation is preserved. Therefore aggregate innovation increases. For low enough discounting, growth e®ects dominate level e®ects, so the e®ect on welfare would be positive due to faster innovation.
Most of the product cycle literature assumes¯rms from the lagging country only imitate. In contrast, here the quality ladders product cycle models of Grossman and Helpman (1991a) and Segerstrom et al. (1990) are modi¯ed to allow¯rms in the South to innovate as well as imitate. Hence the Southern technology frontier may surpass the Northern technology frontier for some products, even though it on average lags behind. Flam and Helpman (1987) and Stokey (1991) have examined the case where Northern production involves a higher quality mix than Southern production, but all Northern products are still of higher quality than Southern products.
Van Elkan (1996) does provide a model where the South shifts from imitation to innovation. There, productivity in imitation depends on the di®erence between the body of world knowledge and the stock of human capital (the knowledge gap), while productivity in innovation depends on past behavior through learning-by-doing. Imitation is easier the larger the knowledge gap due to the larger pool of potential imitations (larger world knowledge stock), so as the knowledge gap closes with successive imitation, imitation becomes relatively more di±cult and innovation relatively more attractive.
The van Elkan model has the unrealistic trait that a technological advantage in imitation assures higher per capital output than a technological advantage in innovation. But in fact, advanced countries with a comparative advantage in innovation have higher living standards than lagging countries with a comparative advantage in imitation: South Korea's per capita GDP is about 60% of that of rich industrial countries such as the United States. In this model, Southern incomes remain below Northern incomes as long as the South maintains its relative advantage in imitation.
The paper is organized as follows. After establishing the behavior of consumers and¯rms (Section 2), we¯nd the steady-state equilibrium when Southern innovation awaits the knowledge base generated by Southern imitation (Section 3). Then we examine what forces promote Southern innovation relative to imitation and compare those e®ects to the case where the South only imitates (Section 4). Proofs of results appear in the Appendix.
The Economy
The economy is composed of two countries, each containing a representative consumer and many¯rms. Firms di®er in their R&D abilities so that Northern¯rms innovate while Southern¯rms imitate and, only once imitation has occurred, do Southern¯rms innovate for each product. The Southern wage falls below the Northern wage, so imitation is pro¯table for Southern¯rms but not for Northern¯rms. In equilibrium, expected pro¯ts from the product market compensate¯rms for their R&D costs, and resources are fully employed in each country.
Consumers
The speci¯cation of the consumer's problem follows Grossman and Helpman (1991a) . Consumers choose from a continuum of products j 2 [0; 1]. Quality level m of product j provides quality q m (j)´¸m. By the de¯nition of quality improvement, new generations are better than the old: q m (j) > q m¡1 (j) ! m >¸m ¡1 !¸> 1. All products start at time t = 0 at quality level m = 0, so the base quality is q 0 (j) =¸0 = 1.
A consumer from country i 2 fN; Sg has additively separable intertemporal preferences given by lifetime utility
where ½ is the common subjective discount factor. Instantaneous utility is
where x im (j; t) is consumption by consumers from country i of quality level m of product j at time t. Consumers maximize lifetime utility subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. Since preferences are homothetic, aggregate demand is found by maximizing lifetime utility subject to the aggregate intertemporal budget constraint
where R(t) = R t 0 r(s)ds is the cumulative interest rate up to time t and A i (0) is the aggregate value of initial asset holdings by consumers from country i. Individuals hold assets in the form of ownership in¯rms, but with a diversi¯ed portfolio, any capital losses appear as capital gains elsewhere so only initial asset holdings remain. Aggregate labor income of all consumers from country i is Y i (t) = L i w i (t), where w i (t) is the wage in country i at time t and L i is the labor supply there, so L i w i (t) is total labor income in country i at time t. Aggregate expenditure of all consumers in country i is
where p m (j; t) is the price of quality level m of product j at time t, and E i (t) is aggregate expenditure of consumers in country i, where aggregate expenditure is E(t) = E N (t) + E S (t). Due to assumed free trade, price levels do not vary across countries. A consumer's maximization problem can be broken into three stages: the allocation of lifetime wealth across time, the allocation of expenditure at each instant across products, and the allocation of expenditure at each instant for each product across available quality levels. In the¯nal stage, consumers allocate expenditure for each product at each instant to the quality level f m(j; t) o®ering the lowest quality-adjusted price, p m (j; t)=¸m. Consumers are indi®erent between quality level m and quality level m ¡ 1 if the relative price equals the quality di®erence p m (j; t)=p m¡1 (j; t) =¸. Settle indi®erence in favor of the higher quality level so the quality level selected is unique. Only the highest quality level available of each product will sell in equilibrium.
In the second stage, consumers then evenly spread expenditure across the unit measure of all products, E i (j; t) = E i (t), as the elasticity of substitution between any two products is constant at unity. Consumers demand x i e m (j; t) = E i (t)=p e m (j; t) units of quality level f m(j; t) of product j and no units of other quality levels of that product. In the¯rst stage, consumers evenly spread lifetime expenditure across time, E i (t) = E i , as the utility function for each consumer is time separable and the aggregate price level will not vary across time log p e m (j; t) = log p e m (j). Since aggregate expenditure is constant across time, the interest rate at each point in time re°ects the discount rate r (t) = ½, so R(t) = ½t in the intertemporal budget constraint.
In summary, consumers evenly spread expenditure across time and products. For each product, they are willing to pay a premium¸for a quality increment and will purchase only the highest quality level available.
Production
The¯rm's problem can be broken down into two stages: R&D and then production. In the production stage (once successful in R&D), each¯rm then chooses the price of its product to maximize its value, given prices and R&D intensities of other¯rms. Assume that¯rms have access to discarded technology (technologies that no longer yield pro¯ts from production, as described later).
Normalize the labor supplies to make the labor requirement in production be one in each country. Normalize prices to make the Southern wage be one w S = 1. De¯ne w´w N =w S as the relative wage. Consequently, the marginal cost of production is c S = c M = 1 for Southern¯rms (innovators or imitators) and c N = w for Northern¯rms. Pro¯ts are price minus cost times
Consider¯rst markets where a Northern¯rm has just succeeded in in-novation. The Northern¯rm engages in limit pricing against the Southern rms with access to discarded technology one quality level below, charging a premium re°ecting consumer's valuation of the quality improvement p N =a nd making sales x N = E=¸. This price is just low enough to keep Southern rms from being able to sell the lower quality level at a pro¯t, since consumers would be willing to pay p N =¸= 1 for the lower quality level, which is the production cost for a Southern¯rm. Instantaneous pro¯ts for the Northern¯rm are
Call these markets Northern-led markets since only Northern¯rms have the ability to produce the state-of-the-art technology. Now consider markets where a Southern¯rm has just imitated. The Southern¯rm engages in limit pricing against the Northern¯rm at the same quality level by charging a price equal to the Northern¯rm's cost p M = w and makes sales x M = E=w. Instantaneous pro¯ts for the Southern¯rm are
Call these markets imitated markets since both Northern and Southern¯rms have the ability to produce the state-of-the-art technology.
Finally consider markets where a Southern¯rm has just succeeded in innovation. The Southern¯rm engages in limit pricing against the other Southern¯rms with access to discarded technology one quality level below, charging a premium re°ecting consumer's valuation of the quality improvement p S =¸and making sales x S = E=¸. Instantaneous pro¯ts for the Southern¯rm are
Call these markets Southern-led markets since only Southern¯rms have the ability to produce the state-of-the-art technology.
As depicted in Figure One , Northern¯rms target all markets for innovation. Southern¯rms target only Northern-led markets for imitation; they do not target imitated or Southern-led markets since they have no cost advantage against other Southern¯rms. Southern¯rms target imitated and Southern-led markets for innovation; they do not target Northern-led markets since lack of a su±cient knowledge base makes innovation targeting Northern-led markets prohibitively di±cult. Comparing across markets, all markets are targeted by Northern innovation; Northern-led markets are additionally targeted by imitation, while imitated and Southern-led markets are additionally targeted by Southern innovation.
A successful Northern innovator gains the value of a¯rm producing in a Northern-led market v N , a successful Southern imitator gains the value of a¯rm producing in an imitated market v M , and a successful Southern innovator gains the value of a¯rm producing in a Southern-led market v S . To¯nd the value of producing¯rms, discount the°ow of instantaneous pro¯ts to account for the chance that the pro¯t stream will be terminated due to innovation or imitation.
Northern-led markets are targeted by both imitation and Northern innovation, so the value of a¯rm producing in a Northern-led market is
imitated markets are targeted by both Northern and Southern innovation, so the value of a¯rm producing in an imitated market is
Southern-led markets are also targeted by both Northern and Southern innovation, so the value of a¯rm producing in a Southern-led market is
These values indicate the reward to successful Northern innovation, imitation and Southern innovation. These rewards must o®set the costs of innovation and imitation for innovation and imitation to occur in equilibrium.
Innovation and Imitation
In the R&D stage, each¯rm chooses its intensity of R&D to maximize its expected value, given the R&D intensities of other¯rms. R&D races occur simultaneously for all products. A Northern¯rm undertaking innovation intensity ¶ N for a time interval dt requires a N ¶ N dt units of Northern labor at cost wa N ¶ N dt and leads to success with probability ¶ N dt. A Southern¯rm undertaking imitation intensity ¹ S for a time interval dt requires a M ¹ S dt units of Southern labor at cost a M ¹ S dt and leads to success with probability ¹ S dt. A Southern¯rm undertaking innovation intensity ¶ S for a time interval dt requires a S ¶ S dt units of Southern labor at cost a S ¶ S dt and leads to success with probability ¶ S dt. Imitation is easier than Southern innovation, and thus requires relatively fewer resources:°´a M =a S < 1. The quality incremenţ is¯xed. Assume each country is at worst one step below the world technology frontier for each product. Such a situation occurs if knowledge of the design of quality levels no longer produced (discarded technology) spreads globally. A technology becomes discarded when the¯rm that invented that quality level no longer earns any pro¯ts from producing it; therefore, no¯rm would have any reason to protect its design.
Southern¯rms innovate only appropriate technologies, quality levels that have already been imitated by a Southern¯rm. The underlying assumption is that the resource requirement a S applies to innovation targeting an imitated or Southern-led market but a substantially higher resource requirement A > a S applies to innovation targeting a Northern-led market, so that Southern innovation costs exceed the expected reward to innovation targeting Northern-led markets in equilibrium: A > v S . Successful prior imitation of a quality level of a product generates a knowledge base that makes subsequent Southern innovation for that product easier. The North might well enjoy lower innovation costs following successful imitation of products in Southern-led markets, but Northern imitation does not occur in equilibrium because the North does not have a production cost advantage relative to the South.
The assumption that Southern innovation proceeds only after successful imitation resembles Glass (1997) , which assumes (in a setting where two quality levels sell) that imitation of the low quality level provides a knowledge base for imitation of the high quality level of each product. Aghion et al. (2001) and Aghion et al. (1997) also make a similar assumption in a onecountry model of innovation: innovation in their models must proceed in a step-by-step fashion.
Firms engage in positive rates of innovation or imitation whenever the expected gains are no less than their costs. As usual, only¯rms that are not currently producing engage in R&D. To generate¯nite rates of innovation and imitation, the expected gains must not exceed their cost. Northern¯rms conduct innovation at intensity ¶ N , earning the reward v N if successful.
Southern¯rms conduct imitation at intensity ¹ S , earning the reward v M if successful.
Southern¯rms also conduct innovation at intensity ¶ S , earning the reward
Focus mainly on the case where all three forms of R&D occur in equilibrium, so that these three R&D conditions all hold with equality. Section 4.4 will con¯rm that parameters leading to such an equilibrium do indeed exist. Section 4.5 will consider the case where innovation is prohibitively costly in the South even following imitation. Resource constraints and conditions for the measure of markets to remain constant complete the model.
Steady-State Equilibrium
The purchasing decisions of consumers and the R&D and pricing decisions of rms have been established. Now R&D and production must be constrained according to resource availability in each country. Further, we impose conditions for the measures of Northern-led, imitated and Southern-led markets to remain constant and establish important relationships between variables of interest in a steady-state equilibrium.
Resource Constraints
Let n N be the measure of Northern-led markets, n M be the measure of imitated markets and n S be the measure of Southern-led markets (which together sum to one). The measure of Northern-led markets is the fraction of products that have a Northern¯rm serving the market. Similarly, the measure of Southern-led markets is the fraction of products that have a Southern innovator serving the market (and likewise for imitated markets).
The¯xed supply of labor is allocated between R&D and production. In the North, labor demand for innovation is a N ¶ N , while labor demand for production is n N E±; in the South, labor demand for imitation is a M ¹ S n N , labor demand for innovation is a S ¶ S (n M + n S ), while labor demand for production is n M E=w + n S E±. For equilibrium in the labor markets, the demand for labor must equal the supply of labor in each country.
The resource constraints limit the amount of R&D and production performed in each country. The two resource supplies must be su±ciently large to support R&D in both countries.
Constant Measures
For any product, whether the market is Northern-led, imitated or Southernled changes over time as innovation or imitation occurs; however, each market type must have°ows in match°ows out for the measure of each market type to remain constant at the aggregate level in a steady-state equilibrium. For Northern-led markets, the measure of products newly innovated by Northern rms must match the measure of products newly imitated
For Southern-led markets, the measure of products newly innovated by Southern¯rms must match the measure of Southern products innovated over by Northern¯rms
Finally, the measures of market types must sum to one
These conditions can be solved to¯nd an expression for each market measure in terms of the intensities of Northern innovation, imitation and Southern innovation.
Since Northern innovation targets all markets, the rate of Northern innovation is the intensity of innovation ¶ N . Since imitation targets only Northern-led markets, the rate of imitation is the intensity of imitation times the measure of Northern-led markets ¹´¹ S n N . Since Southern innovation targets imitated and Southern-led markets, the rate of Southern innovation is the intensity of Southern innovation times the measure of these markets: I S´ ¶S (n M + n S ). The rate of Southern innovation relative to imitation is
By (16), the rate of Southern innovation relative to imitation re°ects the intensity of Southern innovation relative to the intensity of Northern innovation. The rate of Southern innovation can be recovered from the rate of imitation ¹ and the ratio Ã using I S´Ã ¹. Overall, the aggregate rate of innovation is the sum of the Northern and Southern rates of innovation ¶´ ¶ N + ¶ S (n M + n S )´ ¶ N + I S . The aggregate rate of innovation is the fraction of all products that experience quality improvement at each point in time.
Solution With Southern Innovation
The equations reduce to a system of¯ve equations in¯ve unknowns. Assuming Northern innovation ¶ N > 0, Southern innovation ¶ S > 0, and imitation ¹ S > 0 all occur, three conditions are required to ensure that costs equal bene¯ts for each form of R&D. Plugging pro¯ts (5) and producing¯rm value (8) into the return to R&D condition (11) and de¯ning ±´1=¸yields the Northern innovation condition.
Similarly (6), (9), and (12) yield the imitation condition
and (7), (10), and (13) yield the Southern innovation condition.
The resource constraints (14, 15), with the market measures substituted out using the constant measure conditions (16, 17, 18) , form the remaining two equations. For later use in determining their e®ects, we introduce the parameter Á to represent an increase in Southern resources and ¾ to represent an increase in the subsidy to Southern R&D. As a result, (1 + Á) L S is the Southern resource supply. Additionally, the term (1 ¡ ¾) is added to the cost side of the imitation and Southern innovation conditions (21) and (22), as the Southern government bears some of the costs of Southern R&D.
As shown in the Appendix, the de¯nitions of the rate of imitation ¹ and rate of Southern innovation relative to imitation Ã can be applied to translate the system into rates rather than intensities, which proves convenient for directly determining the e®ects of the parameters on the rates of R&D. Also, the system can be reduced to four equations, with the relative wage determined separately.
The relative wage is exclusively determined to ensure that the returns to Southern innovation and imitation are equal in equilibrium. If both imitation and Southern innovation occur in equilibrium (¹ S > 0, ¶ S > 0), the R&D conditions (21, 22) must hold with equality. The relative wage must equal
so that the pro¯ts from imitation are less than pro¯ts from Southern innovation in proportion to the relative ease of imitation.
Southern¯rms all have the same unit costs of production, but imitators sell at price w due to competition from Northern¯rms capable of producing the same quality level whereas innovators sell at price¸re°ecting their quality lead. The relative wage is assured of being above one w > 1 (wages higher in North than South) provided innovations are quality improvements¸> 1 and imitation is easier than innovation in the South°´a M =a S < 1. The relative wage is assured of being smaller than the quality increment w <( imitators charge a lower price than innovators) provided imitation is easier than innovation.
Solution Without Southern Innovation
Before considering parameter changes, the key equations when Southern innovation does not occur should be described so that the situations with and without Southern innovation can later be compared. If the resource requirement in Southern innovation (following imitation) is large enough a S > a S , no Southern¯rms will innovate ¶ S = 0 and thus there would be no markets led by Southern¯rms n S = 0. The Southern innovation condition would be an inequality.
The Northern resource constraint (14) is una®ected, and the Southern resource constraint (15) reduces to
The Northern innovation condition (20) is una®ected, and the imitation condition reduces to
The steady-state conditions for the market measures to be constant are ¹ S n N = ¶ N n M and n N +n M = 1, which lead to the substitutions n N = 1¡n M and
The two R&D conditions and the two resource constraints then determine Northern innovation ¶ N , the measure of imitated markets n M , aggregate expenditure E, and the relative wage w. The rate of imitation can be determined from Northern innovation and the measure of imitated markets ¹´¹ S n N = ¶ N n M . This scenario closely resembles the case of ine±cient Northern followers in Grossman and Helpman (1991a) . The key di®erence is that with access to discarded technologies, Northern innovators target all markets here, not just markets in which imitation has occurred. Now the e®ects of parameters such as resource availability on the endogenous variables can be determined to¯nd what forces can cause Southern innovation to increase and whether aggregate innovation rises or falls.
Innovation Through Imitation
In this section we explore how imitation, Northern innovation, Southern innovation, Southern innovation relative to imitation, aggregate spending and the relative wage depend on the parameters of the model. Southern countries such as the East Asian tigers hope not only to catch up to the technology frontier, but eventually to become among the countries pushing forward the technology frontier. They want to increase the mix of innovation in their R&D. What parameters increase Southern innovation relative to imitation? Can any of these forces increase Southern innovation without reducing aggregate innovation? The propositions below address these questions for the case where Southern innovation does occur, but only following imitation.
Resources
Resources are needed to conduct R&D, so larger Southern resources support more Southern R&D. Since imitation is needed to provide the knowledge base for innovation, Southern innovation relative to imitation grows. An expansion in Southern resources causes both Southern innovation and imitation to rise. Aggregate expenditure rises, which increases resource demand in Southern production by increasing the sales of each Southern producer.
Proposition 1
The rate of imitation, the rate of Southern innovation relative to imitation, the rate of Southern innovation, and the aggregate rate of innovation all increase with larger Southern resources Á. Aggregate expenditure rises, while the relative wage and the rate of Northern innovation are una®ected. More markets become led by Southern¯rms, and fewer by Northern¯rms.
Thus Southern resource accumulation provides one potential approach for shifting Southern R&D toward innovation. Increasing Southern resources has the advantage of increasing the rate Southern innovation relative imitation while still increasing imitation, so that Southern innovation expands along with imitation. This way, the South does not have to sacri¯ce imitation to expand innovation. Figure Two illustrates how an expansion in Southern resources increases both imitation and Southern innovation. The Southern resource constraint is downward sloping: an increase in imitation requires a decrease in Southern innovation. An increase in the supply of Southern resources shifts the Southern resource constraint (LS) up so that more Southern innovation can be supported for any given amount of imitation. The new Southern resource constraint (LS') intersects the upward-sloping Northern resource constraint at a larger level of both imitation and Southern innovation.
Southern R&D Subsidy
Imitation may be di±cult to distinguish from innovation when allocating R&D subsidies. Due to not being able to target subsidies, or perhaps as an intended policy, the South might subsidize both innovation and imitation. However, the results below suggest that the Southern government can use R&D incentives to encourage innovation, even if it cannot distinguish innovation from imitation when making subsidy payments.
A subsidy to Southern R&D causes Southern innovation to rise but imitation to fall. Although the subsidy reduces the costs of imitation, the increase in Southern innovation reduces the reward to imitation by making the pro¯ts of imitators shorter in duration. The reward to imitation is further reduced by a reduction in aggregate expenditure, so pro¯ts are smaller as well as shorter in duration.
Proposition 2 The rate of Southern innovation relative to imitation, the rate of Southern innovation and the aggregate rate of innovation increase while the rate of imitation decreases with a larger Southern R&D subsidy ¾. Aggregate expenditure falls, while the relative wage and the rate of Northern innovation are una®ected. More markets become led by Northern and Southern¯rms, so fewer products have been imitated.
Subsidizing Southern R&D can increase Southern innovation. Northern innovation is una®ected, so aggregate innovation rises as well. However, the reduction in imitation leads to a higher average price level because a smaller fraction of products have been imitated. Also, the reduction in aggregate expenditure means that consumers have less to spend.
Since there are no e®ects on Northern innovation, both of these forces can increase aggregate innovation by increasing Southern innovation. Table  1 summarizes the sign of the e®ects on the endogenous variables. 
To sign the derivatives, the analytical results are done in the limit as the discount rate approaches zero ½ ! 0. The discount rate is presumably close to zero and thus this practice should not much alter the results. However, the e®ects on Northern innovation that are zero above could be nonzero for positive discounting. The e®ects on the relative wage are necessarily zero since they were determined prior to taking the limit. To explore the robustness of the results for ½ > 0, we turn to numerical solutions.
Numerical Examples
When the discount rate approached zero, larger pro¯ts with a shorter duration yielded the same reward to innovation when Southern resources expand. For a positive discount rate, the larger size of the pro¯ts would then dominate their shorter length (as the termination of pro¯ts occurs at a lag), causing the reward to innovation to rise. So intuitively, for an increase in Southern resources, Northern innovation should rise slightly.
On the other hand, for a Southern R&D subsidy, the smaller but longer pro¯ts should yield a somewhat smaller reward to innovation with discounting, so Northern innovation should fall slightly. Since the decrease in Northern innovation should be slight, the increase in Southern innovation should still ensure that aggregate innovation increases.
Indeed, numerical solutions con¯rm this intuition regrading the e®ects on Northern innovation for a positive discount rate. The following results are calculated for discount rate ½ = 1=25 = 4%, a quality increment¸= 3, Northern resources L N = 4, Southern resources L S = 2, resource requirement in Northern innovation a N = 2, resource requirement in Southern innovation a S = 3, and resource requirement in imitation a M = 1.
Starting from the base case, the parameter shifts considered are a Southern R&D subsidy that pays half of the R&D costs of Southern¯rms ¾ = 1=2 or a 50 percent increase in Southern resources Á = 1=2. Table 2 reports the equilibrium values and the implied percentage changes in the endogenous variables relative to the base values for these numerical examples. -26% 196% 19% -9 .1% 0% 10% -60% 61% Á 0.13% 50% 32% 98% 9.7% 14% 0% -12% 16% 74%
The e®ects on Northern innovation, which are zero when ½ ! 0, are all quite small when ½ > 0. Northern innovation rises slightly with Southern resources and falls slightly with Southern R&D subsidies. Even though subsidizing Southern R&D does reduce Northern innovation, Southern innovation expands by more so that aggregate innovation rises.
No Southern Innovation
We now brie°y consider how the model behaves if Southern innovation is too di±cult to occur even after imitation. Aggregate innovation is simply Northern innovation when Southern innovation is absent. The results here are identical to the case of ine±cient Northern followers in Grossman and Helpman (1991a) : an increase in either Southern resources or a subsidy to imitation increases both innovation and imitation.
² The rate of innovation and the rate of imitation increase with larger Southern resources Á. Aggregate expenditure increases, while the relative wage decreases.
² The rate of innovation and the rate of imitation increase with a larger Southern imitation subsidy ¾. Aggregate expenditure and the relative wage both fall. Table 3 summarizes the signs of these e®ects for the case when Southern innovation does not occur. Table 3 . Results When No Southern Innovation ¶ ¹ E w n N n M ¾ + +* --* + -Á + + + -* -+*
The sign of cells marked by an asterisk * in Table 3 depends on whether there is Southern innovation. The e®ects on the relative wage, which were zero with Southern innovation, are all negative in its absence. When both Southern innovation and imitation occur, the relative wage adjusts to equalize their returns. Any policy that a®ects Southern R&D symmetrically (the same consequences for innovation as for imitation) will therefore not a®ect the relative wage.
In the absence of Southern innovation, a subsidy to imitation lowers the cost of imitation, and so the bene¯t of imitation must fall to restore equality between the costs and bene¯ts. A lower relative wage is one means of lowering the reward to imitation: imitators charge a price equal to the costs of the Northern¯rm whose product they imitated, which is the relative wage, so the pro¯ts of an imitator are lower when the relative wage falls.
When Southern resources increase, a lower relative wage leads to a lower price charged by imitators and thus larger sales, and thus more resources absorbed into production in the South. A lower relative wage, by increasing the demand for Southern resources, helps restore equality in the Southern resource constraint when the supply of Southern resources expands.
The e®ects on aggregate innovation are the same regardless of whether innovation occurs in the South. Increased Southern resources or a subsidy to Southern R&D increase aggregate innovation. However, the e®ects on imitation do depend on whether some innovation occurs in the South. A subsidy to Southern R&D clearly expands imitation if there is no Southern innovation, but decreases imitation if Southern innovation then targets products after an imitation has occurred. A subsidy, even though it lowers the cost of imitation, may increase the onslaught of innovation to such a degree that less imitation occurs in equilibrium.
The equilibrium without Southern innovation can be solved for the same parameter values as for Table 2 but for a S > a S = 3:79 as needed for the cost of innovation to exceed its expected bene¯t in the South. Table 4 reports the equilibrium values and their corresponding percentage changes relative to the base values. These numerical values con¯rm the analytical results reported in Table 3 for the case without Southern innovation. Table 4 can also be used to contrast the magnitude of e®ects with and without Southern innovation when the e®ects share the same sign. In particular, the e®ects on aggregate innovation appear to be smaller in the absence of Southern innovation.
Welfare
One might wonder whether one or both countries necessarily bene¯t from the e®ects of these parameter changes on the endogenous variables. To determine the welfare e®ects, an expression for the lifetime utility of a consumer from each country in the steady-state equilibrium must be derived. Toward that aim, instantaneous utility (2) is log u i (t) = log E i + m log¸¡ log p;
where the expected number of innovations arriving in time period t is m = ¶t and the average price level is
Increases in the fraction of products that have been imitated leads to lower prices since the price is w in imitated markets but¸> w in markets where the most recent innovation has not yet been imitated. Instantaneous utility becomes
Lifetime utility (1) is then
Having found the expression for lifetime utility, we can now explore the welfare e®ects of parameter changes. According to Table 1 , subsidizing Southern R&D increases the average price level by decreasing the measure of imitated markets n M , but an increase in Southern resources raises the average price level only if the measure of Northern-led markets is small. Also, an increase in Southern resources increases aggregate expenditure, while a subsidy to Southern R&D decreases it. Lower aggregate expenditure and a higher aggregate price level generate negative level e®ects on welfare for a Southern R&D subsidy. The level e®ect for an increase in Southern resources is less clear: aggregate expenditure rises but the aggregate price level may also rise (if the measure of Northern-led markets is small).
But both forces increase aggregate innovation. If discounting is slight enough, the increase in innovation can dominate any adverse level e®ects, leading to an increase in welfare in each country (the adverse level e®ects could dominate if discounting were more severe). For the parameters used in Table 2 , both countries enjoy a 10% increase in lifetime utility from a 50% increase in Southern resources and an 18% increase in lifetime utility from a 50% subsidy to Southern R&D.
Are the welfare conclusions any di®erent from when innovation does not occur in the South? There were three important di®erences in the e®ects of the parameters on the endogenous variables when there was no Southern innovation. First, an increase in Southern resources always increases the measure of imitated markets (even when the measure of Northern-led markets is small). This di®erence makes level e®ects more favorable by reducing the aggregate price level due to a larger fraction of products having been imitated. An increase in Southern resources raises aggregate expenditure and lowers the aggregate price level, whereas a subsidy to Southern imitation lowers aggregate expenditure and raises the price level.
There are also distributional e®ects now due to changes in the relative wage. Both forces reduce the relative wage, which leaves the North with a smaller share of aggregate expenditure. So the South bene¯ts to a greater degree than the North from any of these parameter changes; however, since the di®erence is a level e®ect, it is apt to be small relative to the growth e®ect of faster innovation when discounting is slight. For the parameters used in Table 4 , both countries enjoy a 2% increase in lifetime utility from a 50% increase in Southern resources, and a 5% increase in lifetime utility from a 50% subsidy to Southern imitation.
Conclusion
This paper develops a model of Southern¯rms switching R&D from imitation towards innovation. Imitation is necessary for the South to build a su±cient knowledge base to make the cost of innovation small enough for innovation to be attractive to Southern¯rms. Absent the knowledge base from imitation, the expected reward to Southern innovation would not cover the innovation cost.
In this setting, how can a Southern country, such as one of the East Asian tigers, shift its R&D toward innovation without sacri¯cing aggregate innovation? The analysis done here is consistent with the view that the East Asian tigers have accomplished their miracles through resource accumulation. One option is to encourage resource accumulation, which releases the Southern resource constraint and permits all Southern R&D activities to grow. Likewise, subsidizing Southern R&D may yield bene¯ts to all. Either approach may have negative level e®ects on welfare, but the positive growth e®ects of faster innovation will dominate if consumers are patient enough. The following derivatives are evaluated at ¾ = Á = 0 and in the limit as ½ ! 0 for expositional ease since the discount rate should be near zero.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
An increase in Southern resources has no e®ect on the rate of Northern innovation or the relative wage @ ¶ N =@Á = @w=@Á = 0, increases the rate of Southern innovation relative to imitation
increases the rate of imitation
as ¶ N ¡ ¹ > 0 for n N > 0, increases the rate of Southern innovation and the aggregate rate of innovation
increases aggregate spending
decreases the measure of Northern-led markets
may decrease the measure of imitated markets
and increases the measure of Southern-led markets.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
An increase in the subsidy to Southern R&D has no e®ect on the rate of Northern innovation or the relative wage @ ¶ N =@¾ = @w=@¾ = 0, increases the rate of Southern innovation relative to imitation
decreases the rate of imitation
increases the rate of Southern innovation and the aggregate rate of innovation
decreases aggregate spending
increases the measure of Northern-led markets
decreases the measure of imitated markets
and increases the measure of Southern-led markets. 
increases the aggregate rate of innovation
increases the measure of imitated markets
and therefore decreases the measure of Northern-led markets @n N =@Á < 0.
A.4 Subsidy to Imitation When No Southern Innovation
An increase in the subsidy to Southern R&D decreases the relative wage
and therefore increases the measure of Northern-led markets @n N =@¾ > 0.
